Tuesday, 17 November 2026
NEXA NEWSHD
Artificial Intelligence

US and Nine Allies Sign San Francisco Declaration to Shield AI Supply Chains From China

The United States and nine allied governments have signed a new declaration pledging to protect the technologies and infrastructure behind artificial intelligence supply chains, in the clearest sign yet that Washington is organising its allies into a single bloc for the technology contest with China. According to Reuters, the San Francisco Declaration was signed on Sunday, 15 November 2026, at a meeting of the founders of the American-led Pax Silica initiative, and was announced by the United States Department of State late the same day.

The ten signatories are the United States, Australia, India, Israel, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Qatar, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom. According to the State Department, the declaration was signed at the Pax Silica Founders Retreat in San Francisco, convened by Jacob Helberg, the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and the European Commission are expected to add their signatures next week, the Financial Times reported, citing Helberg.

The declaration carries the formal title “The San Francisco Declaration on the Secure Foundations of Enduring Prosperity”. Its central proposition is stated in a single sentence: economic security is fundamental to national security. The signatories declare that safeguarding the sensitive technologies and critical infrastructure underpinning what Washington now calls super intelligence supply chains is “a shared endeavour”, and that “the security of each participant is strengthened by the vigilance of all”.

The document sets out, for the first time in a joint text, a common definition of exactly what the ten governments believe must be protected. It identifies two broad categories of strategic assets. The first is sensitive technologies, defined as the goods, software, materials, knowledge, components and inputs used to produce them, and their means of production, where theft, illicit transfer or acquisition by hostile actors would hand over a meaningful military or intelligence advantage, or undue economic leverage. The second is critical infrastructure: the physical and digital systems and assets underpinning super intelligence supply chains, including ports, terminals, transport, communications and logistics networks, the information and energy infrastructure their operations depend on, and the digital platforms that coordinate and manage them. Any disruption, degradation, hostile control or unauthorised exposure of the data flowing through those systems, the declaration says, would cause significant harm or dysfunction.

The signatories also agreed to establish five working groups to turn the declaration into practical cooperation. According to the State Department, the groups will cover pro-innovation policy frameworks; the adoption of super intelligence across key economic sectors; supply chain cooperation across the whole super intelligence technology stack; safe harbours and supply chain security hubs; and super intelligence security and resilience. The declaration itself contains no specific regulations and no implementation timetable, and its practical effect will depend on what those working groups produce in the months ahead.

One footnote in the document underlines how new the language itself is. Some participating countries, it notes, use the term “artificial intelligence” instead of “super intelligence”. The United States government now refers to artificial intelligence as super intelligence after President Donald Trump signed an executive order renaming it, according to the Hindu BusinessLine. The declaration was released jointly by the governments of all ten signatories.

What Pax Silica Is, and Why Washington Built It

Pax Silica is the State Department’s flagship effort on artificial intelligence and supply chain security, launched in December 2025, less than a year before Sunday’s signing. Its stated purpose is to build secure, resilient and innovation-driven supply chains across the entire artificial intelligence technology stack, from critical minerals and energy inputs through advanced manufacturing and semiconductors to artificial intelligence infrastructure and logistics. The name draws on the Latin word “pax”, meaning peace, and “silica”, the compound refined into silicon, the foundational element of computer chips.

The initiative was the brainchild of Helberg, and it sits at the top of a three-layer American architecture for critical minerals and technology supply chains. Beneath it, according to reporting on the programme, sits Vault, which stabilises the upstream supply of minerals through stockpiling, and FORGE, which coordinates the network of supply chains between extraction and end use. Pax Silica anchors the downstream end: the demand for artificial intelligence and semiconductor systems that is meant to pull investment in minerals and manufacturing along with it. The State Department has committed 250 million dollars in foreign assistance through a Pax Silica Fund covering extraction, processing, infrastructure and manufacturing, according to reporting on the initiative.

The coalition has grown quickly. Early members included Australia, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Singapore and the United Kingdom. The Philippines signed on 16 April 2026, and the European Union joined at a summit in June 2026, when close to three dozen economies signed a Joint Statement on AI Opportunity, according to a State Department fact sheet dated 26 June. Reporting on the coalition now puts its membership at roughly two dozen participating economies. Sunday’s declaration was signed by the ten founding participants, a core group inside the wider coalition.

The Philippines has already positioned itself as the first Pax Silica economic security zone, with a proposed industrial and innovation zone of about 4,000 acres at New Clark City in Tarlac, designed to integrate local nickel processing with chip fabrication and artificial intelligence infrastructure. The country’s Bases Conversion and Development Authority has estimated the project could attract between 40 billion and 70 billion dollars in investment and generate more than 130,000 jobs, although construction is not tentatively expected to begin until 2028 and none of the announced investment or employment is guaranteed.

The Other Bloc: China’s Answer in Shanghai

The San Francisco Declaration does not name China. It does not need to. The document speaks of protecting sensitive technologies from “those that would do it harm”, of coordinated efforts against economic coercion, supply chain disruptions and non-market policies, and of cooperation on enforcing each government’s policies to protect sensitive technologies and critical infrastructure from “undue access, influence, or control”. Every one of those phrases is aimed, in the view of analysts who follow the programme, at Beijing.

China has built its own competing architecture. On 16 July 2026, representatives from 29 countries established the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organisation, known as WAICO, headquartered in Shanghai, with the stated purpose of international cooperation and global artificial intelligence governance. Its founding members cited in the organisation’s official account include Kazakhstan, Laos, Pakistan, Russia and Indonesia. The two blocs now offer governments a choice of frameworks for the same technologies, and Washington has made clear that it regards the choice as a real one.

In August, Reuters reported that the United States was preparing to tell dozens of countries that they must pick sides in the artificial intelligence race with China, warning that they would be excluded from the American-led artificial intelligence coalition if they also signed up for Beijing’s competing framework. A draft letter circulating through the State Department, according to subsequent reporting, warned 35 governments that participation in Pax Silica requires a dedicated commitment rather than simultaneous participation in competing initiatives. The letter stops short of naming China. It does not need to.

The tension has already produced a test case. Within three weeks of joining the American-led coalition, Kazakhstan signed up to the Chinese artificial intelligence body and received a formal rebuke from Washington, according to reporting on the episode. Kazakhstan has obvious reasons to keep a foot in both networks: it holds rich critical mineral resources and cheap electricity, while Chinese foreign direct investment in the country hit a record 2.8 billion dollars in 2025, according to the Associated Press. The episode illustrates the gap between the coalition’s stated logic and the messier behaviour of the states it wants to enlist.

The structural fact driving the whole contest is China’s dominance of the materials that the artificial intelligence supply chain is built on. China controls roughly 70 per cent of global rare earth mining, about 85 per cent of refining capacity and around 90 per cent of alloy and magnet production, according to industry data cited in recent reporting. Those are the materials that go into the magnets, motors and electronics inside everything from electric vehicles to the data centres that train artificial intelligence models. Washington’s answer, embodied in Pax Silica, is to organise the demand side: the countries that buy the chips, build the data centres and write the models, so that their combined purchasing power pulls new mines, refineries and factories into being outside China.

Why This Week, and Why San Francisco

The timing of the declaration is not accidental. It comes four days before the first ever three-way meeting of the presidents of the United States, Russia and China, scheduled for Thursday, 19 November in Shenzhen, on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit. China confirmed the meeting on Monday, according to the Hindu BusinessLine, after the White House confirmed it on Friday and the Kremlin confirmed it on Saturday. The three leaders have never met together in this format before. Discussions are expected to cover global conflicts, artificial intelligence and nuclear arms reduction, although a senior American official has said Ukraine will not be on the agenda, and officials expect no nuclear agreement to emerge.

The declaration also lands in the same week that the country hosting the APEC summit and the country that signed the declaration are still operating under a trade truce that now runs only until 10 January 2027. The truce was agreed in Busan in October 2025, extended in September 2026, and will be tested again when Trump and Xi meet in Shenzhen, their third meeting this year. By signing the declaration four days before that meeting, Washington has put its allies’ technology alignment on the table before the two presidents sit down.

The week is also dominated by the company at the centre of the chip trade. Nvidia, the world’s most valuable chipmaker and the supplier of the graphics processors on which most advanced artificial intelligence models are trained, reports quarterly earnings on Tuesday, 17 November, with analysts expecting about 109 billion dollars in revenue, according to reporting on the results. It will be the first earnings call led by Colette Kress, the longtime chief financial officer who became interim chief executive after Jensen Huang resigned on 12 November, ending a 33-year run at the head of the company he co-founded in 1993.

Huang’s departure followed revelations of extramarital affairs, including one involving a businesswoman whom American officials concluded was a Chinese intelligence asset, which raised questions over exports of the company’s advanced artificial intelligence chips to China, according to the Financial Times. The company lost about 430 billion dollars in market value in two trading sessions, according to the same reporting. On Sunday, the Financial Times reported that Huang is considering a return as chief executive and has discussed the possibility with confidants, with allies assembling a so-called “war room” of Silicon Valley executives to lobby for his reinstatement and to seek support from the White House. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has said Nvidia needs a “dramatic shake-up” with a chief executive from outside the company. Taiwan’s stock market fell 6.03 per cent on Monday, its second-largest point drop ever, with TSMC down 5.74 per cent, according to reporting on the session. Nvidia has made no announcement about Huang returning, and Kress remains interim chief executive. Any comeback would need the board’s approval: Huang owns about 3.6 per cent of the company and, unlike some founder chief executives, holds no dual-class shares giving him voting control.

The declaration does not mention Nvidia. But the crisis at the company that makes the chips, the market turmoil in Taiwan where most of them are manufactured, and the declaration signed in San Francisco are three faces of the same fact: the supply chain for artificial intelligence is now treated by governments as a question of national security, not merely of commerce.

The Working Groups: Where the Declaration Will Succeed or Fail

Declarations are cheap. Working groups are where the costs appear. The five groups agreed on Sunday will have to answer questions that the declaration itself leaves open. The first group, on pro-innovation policy frameworks, must reconcile the very different regulatory approaches of its members: the European Union’s rules-based model, the United States’ lighter-touch approach, and the Gulf states’ investment-led strategies. The second, on adoption of super intelligence across key economic sectors, must decide which sectors count as key, and what adoption actually means in practice for governments that have barely begun to deploy the technology.

The third group, on supply chain cooperation across the super intelligence stack, faces the hardest task. The stack runs from rare earth mines through refining, wafer fabrication, chip packaging, data centre construction, power supply, networking and cloud platforms to the foundation models themselves. No single country controls more than a fragment of it. The United States designs most of the leading chips. Taiwan manufactures most of them. The Netherlands, through ASML, holds a monopoly on the extreme ultraviolet lithography machines without which the most advanced chips cannot be made. South Korea controls high-bandwidth memory. The Gulf states offer cheap energy and sovereign capital. Japan supplies materials and manufacturing equipment. Each member brings a chokepoint of its own, and each depends on the others for the rest.

The fourth group, on safe harbours and supply chain security hubs, is the most novel. The concept, as described in reporting on the initiative, is to create trusted zones where artificial intelligence-related investment can be concentrated with shared security standards, with the Philippines’ New Clark City project as the first example. The fifth group, on super intelligence security and resilience, must deal with the hardest question of all: how to share information about threats to the supply chain among ten governments with different intelligence cultures, different relationships with China, and different tolerances for risk.

None of this will happen quickly. The declaration contains no deadlines, and reporting on the agreement notes that its actual impact is expected to emerge only during follow-up working-level discussions. The test will be whether the groups produce concrete decisions: joint projects, shared export control lists, coordinated investment, and agreed standards for what counts as a trusted supplier. If they do, the declaration will be remembered as the moment the artificial intelligence supply chain acquired a formal alliance structure. If they do not, it will join the long list of summit declarations that described a problem without solving it.

Analysis: Why It Matters

A declaration is not a treaty, and that is the point

The San Francisco Declaration is deliberately not a treaty. It creates no binding obligations, sets no deadlines, and establishes no secretariat. That is not a weakness in the eyes of its authors; it is the design. A treaty would have required ratification in ten parliaments, years of negotiation over legal text, and compromises that would have diluted the central proposition. A declaration can be signed in an afternoon and put to work the next morning. The risk is that it can also be forgotten by the next morning. The five working groups are the mechanism by which the declaration either becomes a programme or fades into a press release. Watch what they produce in their first six months, not what the declaration says.

The real audience is not in the room

Ten governments signed the declaration. The government it is most concerned with did not, and was never invited. China is the unspoken subject of every clause, from the protection of sensitive technologies to the coordination against economic coercion. But there is a second audience that matters just as much: the governments that have not yet chosen. The draft letter to 35 countries, warning that participation in Pax Silica requires a dedicated commitment, shows that Washington knows the coalition’s growth depends on persuading fence-sitters that the American framework offers more than the Chinese one. Kazakhstan’s attempt to join both, and the rebuke that followed, suggests that Washington is willing to enforce that choice. The question is whether the fence-sitters see the rebuke as a sign of strength or of insecurity.

Supply chains are the new alliances

For most of the post-war era, alliances were about armies. Pax Silica is an alliance about factories, mines, ports and power grids. That reflects a change in what governments believe determines security. A country that cannot obtain advanced chips cannot train advanced models; a country that cannot train advanced models cannot build the systems its military, its economy and its intelligence services will depend on. The declaration’s insistence that economic security is fundamental to national security is not rhetoric. It is a statement of how Washington now understands power. The test of that understanding will be whether the ten signatories are willing to pay the costs it implies: higher prices for diversified supply, slower procurement while trusted alternatives are built, and the political friction of telling companies where they may and may not sell.

The Nvidia crisis shows why the declaration was needed, and why it may not be enough

It is no coincidence that the declaration was signed in the week Nvidia lost its chief executive, its share price fell, and Taiwan’s stock market recorded one of its worst days. The artificial intelligence supply chain is extraordinarily concentrated: a handful of companies, in a handful of countries, make the machines and the chips on which the entire industry depends. A scandal at one company, a storm over one strait, or a single export control decision can move markets by hundreds of billions of dollars in a day. The declaration is an attempt to build resilience into that concentration by spreading it across ten governments. But spreading a supply chain across governments does not by itself spread it across factories. The fabs, the lithography machines and the refineries still sit where they sit. Diversification will take years and hundreds of billions of dollars. The declaration is a promise to begin; it is not the beginning’s completion.

What “super intelligence” really means

The declaration’s use of the term “super intelligence”, and the footnote acknowledging that some signatories still say “artificial intelligence”, is more than a curiosity of drafting. It signals that the American government now frames the technology not as a product but as a threshold: a level of capability beyond which the strategic consequences change in kind, not merely in degree. That framing matters because it determines what gets protected. If artificial intelligence is a product, then supply chain security is a matter of trade policy. If super intelligence is a threshold, then it is a matter of national survival, and the measures justified in its name expand accordingly. The governments that signed the declaration have accepted, at least on paper, the stronger framing. Whether their parliaments, their industries and their publics accept it too will decide how far the coalition can go.

What to Watch Next

  1. The European signatures. Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and the European Commission are expected to sign next week, according to the Financial Times. The Netherlands matters most: through ASML it controls the lithography machines without which advanced chips cannot be made. Watch whether the Dutch signature comes with conditions.
  2. The first working group meetings. The declaration resolves to establish five groups but sets no date for their first sessions. Their agendas, chairs and membership will show whether the declaration is being treated as a programme or as a gesture.
  3. Nvidia’s earnings on Tuesday. The results, and Colette Kress’s first call as interim chief executive, will show how much damage the leadership crisis has done to the company at the centre of the chip trade, and whether investors believe the board can stabilise it.
  4. The Shenzhen summit on Thursday. The first trilateral meeting of Trump, Xi and Putin will test whether the declaration hardens Beijing’s position or gives Washington leverage. Watch for any Chinese response that names Pax Silica directly.
  5. The 35-country letter. If the draft warning reported in August becomes a formal demarche, watch which governments comply, which protest, and which quietly join both frameworks anyway. Kazakhstan will not be the last test case.
  6. The Pax Silica Fund. The 250 million dollars committed so far is small against the scale of the supply chains involved. Watch for a larger funding announcement, and for the first joint projects it finances.
  7. The Philippines hub. The New Clark City project, with construction tentatively expected from 2028, is the first attempt to build a physical Pax Silica economic security zone. Its financing and its first tenants will show whether the safe harbour concept can move from paper to concrete.

Sources

About the Author — Abdul Mannan

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