Dozens of Cancer Patients Given Chemotherapy for Years at Coventry NHS Trust, Damning Review Finds
Dozens of cancer patients at a major NHS hospital in England were given a powerful chemotherapy drug for years longer than national guidance allows, in some cases for more than a decade, according to a damning independent review published on Wednesday, 18 November 2026. Some of the patients were misdiagnosed. Others were told they would die if they stopped taking the drug, even though that was not true. Six of them suffered severe harm.
The review, carried out by the Royal College of Physicians (RCP), examined the care of brain tumour patients at University Hospitals Coventry and Warwickshire NHS Trust (UHCW). It found that the chemotherapy drug temozolomide, known as TMZ, was prescribed again and again, month after month, long after the point at which standard practice says it should stop. In the worst cases, patients received more than 100 cycles of the drug over 13 years. One of them later developed leukaemia, a fast-growing blood cancer, as a side effect of the excessive treatment.
The trust has apologised. Its chief executive, Professor Andy Hardy, and its chair, Sue Noyes, said in a joint statement that the care described in the report was “far below the standards our patients deserve and that we expect”, adding: “We let you down, and for that we offer our sincere apologies.” More than 40 patients are now taking legal action against the trust, and their lawyers are calling on the Health Secretary to order an independent public inquiry.
The findings were published on Wednesday after a review that the trust itself commissioned. The report is the full, final version of findings that were first leaked to the BBC in September 2026, when the preliminary conclusions described patients receiving prolonged courses of the drug with “little or no evidence of benefit” and staff failings that amounted to a “betrayal of patient trust”.
What the review found
The Royal College of Physicians looked in detail at 20 cases of patients treated by a retired consultant clinical oncologist, referred to in the report only as Dr Y. The trust has named him as Professor Ian Brown, who worked at the hospital from 1996 until his retirement in December 2023. Concerns about his practice were first raised by colleagues when his patients were handed over to them after he retired.
Of the 20 cases examined, 15 were rated “unsatisfactory overall” and five were judged to require improvement. Not one of the 20 was rated as demonstrating good clinical practice. Working to strict definitions of harm, the review team concluded that six patients had suffered severe harm, five had suffered moderate harm and eight had suffered low levels of harm. In the final case, the reviewers could not reach a judgement on whether the harm was moderate or severe.
The report found that patients were kept on long-term, repeated cycles of temozolomide in a way that went against standard practice and national guidance. The drug is normally given for six cycles, over about six months, after radiotherapy for the most aggressive form of brain tumour, glioblastoma. For slower-growing, low-grade gliomas, guidance allows a maximum of 12 cycles. At Coventry, some patients received ten, twelve or even more than twenty times that amount.
“There were multiple examples of extended treatment with TMZ (and, in some cases, other second-line chemotherapy drugs) being continued despite clear evidence of toxicity and/or deterioration in the patient’s condition, with little or no evidence of benefit,” the report said, according to the Press Association.
The review also found that diagnoses were wrong or insufficiently supported in some cases, and that the way consent was obtained from patients was inadequate in all 20 cases examined. In some cases, there was no documentation of consent where it would have been expected. Where consent forms existed, they were often of poor quality and lacked relevant information. Some patients were told that stopping the drug would kill them, even though the reviewers found that was not true.
Perhaps most strikingly, the report concluded that the systems designed to oversee the service had failed completely. “There was no evidence of effective challenge at any stage from the wider multidisciplinary team, including nursing and pharmacy teams,” it said. “Some very unusual therapeutic decisions appear not to have been challenged.” The review team said that even where harm was graded as lower, it did “not underestimate the psychological impact that receiving poor care from a professional in a position of trust can have on patients and their families”.
The scale of the problem appears to go well beyond the 20 cases the college examined in depth. According to the report, 83 patients received extended courses of temozolomide at the trust between 2017 and 2023 alone. The review warned that the number of patients affected, including those who have since died, is higher than the 20 cases it studied. The trust spent more than £3.6 million on temozolomide between 2007 and 2023, more than ten times the amount spent by comparable NHS hospitals.
The patients who lived with the treatment
Behind the report’s clinical language are individual lives reshaped by years of unnecessary treatment. Becky Jones was 21 years old when she was told she had a grade 4 glioblastoma, an aggressive brain tumour, and that she had between six and twelve months to live. She went on to receive more than 100 cycles of temozolomide over more than a decade. She was told she would need to take the drug for the rest of her life, and when she questioned why she was still being given chemotherapy while her scans were stable, she was repeatedly told that without it she would die.
It was only in May 2025, when independent experts reviewed her case on behalf of her lawyers, that she was told she had never had a brain tumour at all. “For years, I questioned why I was still being given chemotherapy when my scans were stable, but I was repeatedly told that without it I would die,” she said. “Seeing the RCP independently confirm serious failings is validating, although it is incredibly painful to see how many opportunities there were to protect us. I now need a full and honest explanation of what happened to me. This has shaped my entire adult life. I lost career opportunities, family moments and years to treatment and the constant fear that I was going to die. The report cannot give me that time back, but an independent review may finally provide the answers and accountability I have been fighting for — and help ensure no other patient has to fight this hard to be heard.”
Gayle Bodinnar received more than 150 rounds of temozolomide over at least 12 years, which she says left her housebound and badly damaged her quality of life. In the worst example identified by the review, a patient was given more than 100 cycles of the drug over 13 years before clinicians identified that the original diagnosis had been wrong: the patient in fact had a slow-growing, low-grade brain tumour. That patient later developed acute myeloid leukaemia, an aggressive form of blood cancer. Developing new cancers is a known risk of prolonged exposure to drugs such as temozolomide.
David Bown was diagnosed with a brain tumour in 2016 and suffered permanent neurological damage following complications after surgery. He was then treated with temozolomide for more than eight years. His condition has since deteriorated to the point where he can no longer speak clearly and depends on his family completely. His father, Stephen Bown, said what had happened to his son had been devastating. “Before, he was working full-time, playing football, coaching and managing an under-9s football team and living his own life,” he said. “His condition has now deteriorated to the point where he can no longer speak clearly and he depends on us completely. David can’t tell people himself what this has done to him any more, so I have to do that for him. These findings finally recognise the seriousness of what happened to patients like David, but there are still so many questions about how it was allowed to happen.”
Patients who are suing the trust say the effects of the prolonged treatment included crippling fatigue, confusion, sickness and seizures, and left them unable to pursue normal day-to-day activities. More than 40 patients have raised concerns about their treatment and are pursuing legal action. The law firm Brabners, which represents more than 40 of them, is calling for an independent public inquiry, and says cases have been referred to the police, although no action has been taken so far.
The drug, the guidance and the numbers that should have alarmed someone
Temozolomide is a chemotherapy drug used to treat certain brain tumours, including glioblastoma, the most common and most aggressive primary brain tumour in adults. It works by damaging the DNA of cancer cells, stopping them from dividing. It is a powerful drug with serious side effects, and that is precisely why its use is governed by strict limits. The standard course, established by the Stupp protocol that has been the backbone of glioblastoma treatment for two decades, combines the drug with radiotherapy and then continues it for six monthly cycles. Extending treatment beyond that is not routine practice, and the evidence base for doing so is thin: longer courses expose patients to cumulative toxicity, including damage to the bone marrow, without any proven gain in survival.
That is the context in which the Coventry figures are so striking. National guidance for temozolomide was first published in 2005, and the trust has now extended its own historical review back to that year to try to identify everyone who may have been affected. Between 2007 and 2023, the trust spent more than £3.6 million on the drug — over ten times the amount spent by comparable NHS hospitals. In an organisation where prescribing is tracked, audited and budgeted, a tenfold difference in spending on a single drug, sustained over sixteen years, is the kind of signal that ought to have prompted questions long before a consultant retired and his patients were handed to colleagues.
The review’s central recommendation is that every living patient who received more than 12 monthly cycles of temozolomide should now have their case independently reviewed. It also says the trust should consider reviewing the large number of patients who have since died after receiving the same non-standard treatment. The trust says it has extended its historical review back to 2005, when national guidance for the drug was first published, “to ensure affected patients are identified and supported”.
How the scandal came to light
The failures were not discovered by an audit or an inspection. They came to light because a consultant retired. When Professor Brown retired in December 2023, his patients were handed over to colleagues, who raised concerns about the treatment those patients had been receiving. The trust then began an internal patient safety review covering patients treated between 2017 and 2023, and commissioned the Royal College of Physicians to conduct an independent review of patients who had received more than 12 cycles of temozolomide in that period.
In January 2025, the Care Quality Commission, the regulator that inspects health and social care services in England, confirmed that it was investigating the misuse of the medication at the trust. As of 2025, the findings of the trust’s own internal review had still not been made public, with the trust saying it was waiting for the Royal College of Physicians review to conclude.
In September 2026, preliminary findings from the Royal College review were leaked to the BBC. The leaked findings said patients had routinely been given prolonged courses of the drug with “little or no evidence of benefit” and described staff failings that amounted to a “betrayal of patient trust”. The BBC also reported that many more of Professor Brown’s patients had come forward to say they had been given temozolomide for years, leaving them with a variety of serious medical problems. The BBC said it had attempted to contact the retired professor several times. The Royal College of Physicians said Professor Brown did “not take up the opportunity to engage with the review”, and the review team said it had been unable to discuss its concerns directly with him.
The full findings were published on Wednesday, 18 November 2026, and the trust issued its public apology the same day. Professor Hardy and Ms Noyes said in their statement that meaningful action had been taken to address the concerns in the report, and that the trust recognised “the concern, distress and loss of trust experienced by those who placed their faith in us during some of the most difficult moments of their lives”. They added: “It also, distressingly, shows that some patients experienced harm because of the care they received. This is far below the standards our patients deserve and that we expect. We let you down, and for that we offer our sincere apologies.”
Calls for a public inquiry
The patients and their lawyers say an apology and an internal review are not enough. Brabners, the law firm representing more than 40 patients, is calling on the Health Secretary to commission an independent public inquiry. The patients themselves have echoed that call. Becky Jones said she needed “a full and honest explanation of what happened to me”, and David Bown’s father said there were “still so many questions about how it was allowed to happen”.
A public inquiry would have powers that a college review does not: it could compel witnesses to give evidence, including the retired consultant who declined to engage with the Royal College review, and it could examine not only the prescribing decisions but the management and oversight systems that allowed them to continue for so long. It could also look at the roles of the bodies that might have been expected to spot the problem earlier — the trust’s own governance, the regulator, and the professional bodies.
Whether the government agrees to an inquiry is now the central political question arising from the report. The Health Secretary has not yet responded publicly to the calls, and the patients’ lawyers have made clear they intend to keep pressing. For the patients, the stakes are not abstract. Many of them are living with permanent damage, and some of the people affected have already died. The review’s recommendation that the trust consider examining the cases of dead patients who received the same treatment underlines that the full scale of the harm may never be known from the 20 cases alone.
Analysis: Why It Matters
The scandal is the oversight, not one doctor alone
It is tempting to read this story as the story of one consultant who prescribed too much of a dangerous drug for too long. That reading is incomplete, and it is the reading the report itself rejects. The Royal College of Physicians found that “there was no evidence of effective challenge at any stage from the wider multidisciplinary team, including nursing and pharmacy teams”. A consultant does not prescribe chemotherapy in a vacuum. The drug is ordered, dispensed by pharmacists, administered by nurses, reviewed in multidisciplinary team meetings and recorded in systems that track spending. At every one of those stages, somebody had an opportunity to ask why a patient was on their fiftieth, eightieth or hundredth cycle of a drug that guidance says should stop after six.
Nobody did — or, if anybody did, their challenge was not recorded and not acted upon. That is a failure of a whole system of checks, not of a single pair of hands. It is also the hardest kind of failure to fix, because it does not have a single cause. It involves the culture of a department, the deference that can surround a senior consultant, the way multidisciplinary meetings are run, and the willingness of junior staff to question a senior colleague’s judgement. The report’s finding that “some very unusual therapeutic decisions appear not to have been challenged” is, in its quiet way, the most damning sentence in the whole document. Unusual decisions are exactly the ones a system is supposed to catch.
There is a wider lesson here for every hospital in the country. The safeguards that are meant to protect patients — pharmacy checks, team meetings, audits, spending reviews — only work if the people operating them are willing to use them. A system that looks robust on paper can be hollow in practice if deference and habit silence the questions it exists to ask.
“For the rest of your life” — consent was the second failure
The report’s findings on consent deserve as much attention as its findings on prescribing. In all 20 cases examined, there were concerns about how consent was obtained and how treatment was explained to patients. In some cases there was no documentation of consent at all. Where forms existed, they were often of poor quality and lacked relevant information. And some patients were told that if they stopped taking temozolomide they would die, when that was not true.
This matters for a reason that goes beyond paperwork. Consent is the mechanism by which a patient keeps some control over what happens to their own body. A patient who is told, falsely, that stopping a drug will kill them is not making a free choice to continue; they are being frightened into continuing. Becky Jones’s account captures this precisely: she questioned for years why she was still being given chemotherapy when her scans were stable, and was repeatedly told that without it she would die. She was, in effect, held in treatment by fear.
There is also a subtler point. Chemotherapy is gruelling. Patients endure it because they believe it is keeping them alive. To discover, years later, that the treatment was unnecessary — or worse, that the cancer it was supposedly treating was never there — is a particular kind of harm. It is not only the physical damage of the drug, though that is real and in some cases permanent. It is the theft of years lived under a death sentence that was never true, and the loss of the career opportunities, family moments and ordinary life that Becky Jones described. The review team recognised this when it wrote that it did “not underestimate the psychological impact” of poor care from a professional in a position of trust. That sentence, too, should be read carefully: it is an acknowledgement that the harm here is not measured only in cycles of a drug, but in years of a life.
The numbers that should have set off alarms
One of the most striking facts in the report is also one of the simplest: between 2007 and 2023, the trust spent more than £3.6 million on temozolomide, over ten times the amount spent by comparable NHS hospitals. Spending data is not a clinical judgement. It is a number on a spreadsheet, visible to finance teams, pharmacy departments and trust management. A tenfold outlier, sustained for sixteen years, is the kind of anomaly that audit systems exist to detect.
The same is true of the patient numbers. Eighty-three patients received extended courses of the drug between 2017 and 2023 alone. Each of those patients had a record, a prescription history and a series of appointments. The information was all there, in the trust’s own systems, for years. The question the report raises, without quite answering it, is why nobody joined the dots. Was the data never looked at? Was it looked at and explained away? Or was it simply nobody’s job to look?
This is the question a public inquiry would be best placed to answer, because it is a question about management and governance rather than about medicine. And it is the question with the widest implications. If a tenfold spending anomaly on a toxic drug can go unnoticed for sixteen years in one trust, it is reasonable to ask what other anomalies are going unnoticed elsewhere. The NHS collects vast amounts of data on prescribing. The Coventry case suggests that collecting data and using it are two very different things.
Why the wait for the full report matters
The timeline of this story is itself part of the story. Concerns were raised by colleagues in late 2023. The regulator confirmed an investigation in January 2025. Preliminary findings were leaked to the BBC in September 2026. The full report was published in November 2026 — nearly three years after the concerns were first raised, and more than a year after the BBC reported that patients had been given the drug “with little or no evidence of benefit”.
That is a long time for patients to wait for an official account of what happened to them. Becky Jones learned in May 2025, from independent experts acting for her lawyers, that she had never had a brain tumour. She then had to wait another eighteen months for the Royal College to confirm, publicly, that the care she received was unsatisfactory. David Bown, who can no longer speak clearly, waited through the same period while his condition deteriorated.
There are legitimate reasons why a careful review takes time. Cases must be examined in detail, records must be gathered, and those criticised must be given a chance to respond. But the delay also illustrates a structural problem with the way the NHS handles serious failures: the process is slow, the findings are not shared until they are final, and in the meantime patients are left to fight for answers through lawyers and the media. The leak to the BBC in September 2026, which the trust and the college did not welcome, was in one sense the moment the public first learned the scale of what had happened. That a leak was needed at all is worth reflecting on.
What a public inquiry would have to answer
The patients and their lawyers want a public inquiry, and the report gives them a strong case. A college review can examine clinical records and make recommendations. It cannot compel the retired consultant to give evidence, it cannot examine the trust’s management in the round, and it cannot look at the regulator’s role. A public inquiry could do all three.
Britain has been here before. The Gosport Independent Panel, which reported in 2018, found that the lives of more than 450 patients at Gosport War Memorial Hospital had been shortened by the clinically unjustified use of opioid painkillers between 1987 and 2001, and that concerns raised by nurses and families had been systematically ignored for years. The parallels with Coventry are uncomfortable: a single drug, prescribed far beyond what was justified, over many years, with warnings missed and families left to fight for answers. At Gosport, too, the full truth only emerged decades after the events, through a panel with the authority to demand records and hear evidence that earlier investigations had not obtained.
Whether Coventry warrants a full public inquiry is a decision for the Health Secretary, and it will not be taken lightly: inquiries are expensive, slow and politically charged. But the argument for one is not only about Coventry. It is about whether the NHS has a reliable way of learning from failures that span many years and many patients. The Royal College review has established what happened to 20 patients. It has not established, because it was not designed to, why nobody stopped it, who knew what and when, or whether the same thing could be happening now, somewhere else. Those are the questions that matter most to the patients still waiting for answers, and they are the questions only an inquiry with real powers can answer.
What to Watch Next
- The Health Secretary’s response: Whether the government agrees to an independent public inquiry, as the patients’ lawyers are demanding, will be the first test of how seriously the findings are taken. Watch for a statement in Parliament or a written ministerial response in the coming days.
- The independent case reviews: The Royal College has recommended that every living patient who received more than 12 monthly cycles of temozolomide should have their case independently reviewed. How quickly those reviews happen, and what they find, will determine how many more patients are identified.
- The cases of patients who have died: The report says the trust should consider reviewing the large number of dead patients who received the same non-standard treatment. The results of that exercise, if it happens, could substantially increase the known scale of the harm.
- The police referral: The patients’ lawyers say cases have been referred to the police but no action has been taken so far. Whether the police open an investigation, and on what basis, will be closely watched.
- The Care Quality Commission’s investigation: The regulator confirmed in January 2025 that it was investigating the misuse of the medication at the trust. Its findings, and any enforcement action, have yet to be published.
- The trust’s own historical review: UHCW says it has extended its review back to 2005, when national guidance for temozolomide was first published. The outcome of that review, and whether it identifies patients treated before 2017, will show how far back the problem really goes.
- Lessons for the wider NHS: Whether NHS England orders other trusts to audit their own temozolomide prescribing, or introduces new safeguards on long-term chemotherapy, will show whether the system treats Coventry as an isolated failure or as a warning.
Sources
- The Independent — “Calls for public inquiry after dozens of cancer patients overprescribed chemotherapy for years”
- Press Association via Gazette Herald — “Patients ‘severely harmed’ and left on chemotherapy for years at NHS trust”
- Hello Rayo (PA) — “Patients left on chemotherapy for years at NHS trust, report finds”
- Wikipedia — “Temozolomide overprescription incident” (background and timeline, including the BBC reporting and the CQC investigation)
- The Scottish Sun — “Man given 100 cycles of chemo for misdiagnosed cancer develops leukaemia in shocking NHS blunder”
- The British Eye — “Report Exposes Years of Chemotherapy Failures at NHS Trust”