Friday, 20 November 2026
NEXA NEWSHD
Middle East

US Senate Rejects Bid to End Iran War in 51-48 Vote, Handing Trump a Symbolic Victory After Midterm Rebuke

The United States Senate voted on Thursday to reject a resolution that would have directed President Donald Trump to end the war in Iran or obtain Congress’s approval to continue it, handing the president a symbolic victory in the first vote on the conflict since voters delivered Democrats a sweeping midterm triumph widely read as a rebuke of the war.

The measure, House Concurrent Resolution 93, failed by 51 votes to 48, according to Reuters. The vote was announced at 2:42 p.m. Eastern time, and it marked the first time either chamber of Congress had taken up a major Iran war measure since the midterm elections of 3 November, in which Democrats won control of both the House and the Senate from January.

Only three Republicans — Susan Collins of Maine, Lisa Murkowski of Alaska and Rand Paul of Kentucky — voted with the Democrats in favour of the resolution. One Democrat, John Fetterman of Pennsylvania, voted with the Republicans against it. Senator Chris Murphy of Connecticut did not vote, according to the official roll call.

The outcome leaves the legal position of the war exactly where it has stood since it began on 28 February 2026: American forces are fighting Iran in a conflict that Congress has never declared and never authorised, under a 1973 law whose deadlines the White House says no longer apply, and the one instrument Congress has used to demand a withdrawal — a concurrent resolution — is one the president is free to ignore. The Senate has now voted more than a dozen times on Iran war powers measures since March. Only once, in June, did both chambers agree on a withdrawal demand. Nothing followed.

How the vote broke down

The resolution had passed the House of Representatives on 15 September by 220 votes to 204, with seven Republicans supporting it, according to the Washington Post. It then waited two months for a Senate vote, and it arrived in a chamber transformed by the midterms — or rather, in a chamber about to be transformed. The Democrats who won control of the Senate on 3 November do not take their seats until the new Congress convenes on 3 January 2027. Thursday’s vote was taken by the outgoing Republican majority, in its final weeks in power.

That timing shaped everything about the result. The three Republicans who crossed the aisle were the same three who have voted for nearly every Iran war powers measure this year: Collins, who lost her re-election bid in the midterms; Murkowski; and Paul, the Senate’s most consistent critic of unauthorised wars. All three had voted the same way on the previous war powers vote in September. Fetterman, meanwhile, has voted against every Iran war powers resolution, and he did so again on Thursday.

The most revealing votes were the ones cast by senators who have criticised the war but voted against this resolution. Senator Thom Tillis of North Carolina, who is retiring and who voted for an earlier war powers resolution in September, voted no on Thursday. He told CBS News that the measure “doesn’t go to the president, so it’s just a statement from Congress,” according to a report citing the network. Senator Josh Hawley of Missouri, another Republican critic of the war, also opposed the measure — not, he said, because of its substance, but because of its process. He told USA Today that Congress should lean more heavily on its power to defund the war to draw the conflict down. “It’s time to bring the war to a close,” Hawley said. “Speaking just for Missouri voters, I think that’s their message as well.” Asked about the prospect of Mr Trump ramping up strikes in the region, Hawley replied: “Let’s hope not.”

Senator Tim Sheehy of Montana spoke against the resolution on the Senate floor, arguing that the United States could not ignore the threat posed by Iran, according to the Washington Post. The pattern was familiar from every war powers vote this year: a handful of Republicans willing to break with the president, a larger group sympathetic to the criticism but unwilling to hand the Democrats a symbolic win, and a Democratic minority — soon to be a majority — unable to force the issue through the current chamber.

What the resolution would — and would not — have done

House Concurrent Resolution 93 was introduced under the War Powers Resolution of 1973, the law passed in the aftermath of the Vietnam War to limit how long a president can keep American forces in combat without Congress’s approval. The measure directed the president to remove United States forces from hostilities against Iran unless Congress declared war or enacted a specific authorisation for the use of military force.

But the resolution, as a concurrent resolution, would not have had the force of law. It would never have reached the president’s desk, because concurrent resolutions are not presented to the president for signature or veto. As USA Today reported, the measure “would not have compelled Trump to end the war in Iran, as it would not have been legally enforceable.” Its defeat, in that sense, changes nothing in law — but it revealed, in public and on the record, how little appetite Senate Republicans have for constraining the president even now, weeks after an election in which their party lost both chambers of Congress.

The White House has already shown what it does with such resolutions. In June, both chambers of Congress passed a nearly identical measure, House Concurrent Resolution 86 — the House on 3 June by 215 votes to 208, and the Senate on 23 June by 50 votes to 48. It was the first time the Senate had passed an Iran war powers measure in this war. The administration ignored it, and the war continued. A second House-passed measure failed in the Senate on 24 September by 49 votes to 50, with Collins, Murkowski, Paul and Tillis voting for it. Thursday’s vote was the third attempt of its kind to fail, and the first since the midterms.

The distinction between a concurrent resolution and a joint resolution sits at the heart of the story. A joint resolution, if passed by both chambers, goes to the president, who can sign it or veto it; overriding a veto requires two-thirds of both chambers. A concurrent resolution, since the Supreme Court’s 1983 ruling in INS v. Chadha, cannot give legally binding orders to the executive branch. The Democrats’ coming majority has promised to change the instrument. Hakeem Jeffries, the expected Speaker of the House in the new Congress, has vowed to move a resolution that has the force of law and “take the fight around ending the war to the Oval Office,” according to USA Today. “There’s nothing more powerful than putting that bill on the president’s desk. We have the ability to do it,” Jeffries said at a summit hosted by The Atlantic.

Kaine’s case, and the limits of the law

The architect of the Senate Democrats’ war powers strategy is Senator Tim Kaine of Virginia, who has forced vote after vote on the question since the war began. Before Thursday’s roll call, he took to the Senate floor to argue that the midterm result had settled the question of what the public thinks. “Its unpopularity was made absolutely, manifestly clear in the election results of November 3,” Kaine said, according to Reuters.

Kaine has made the same constitutional argument for years, across administrations of both parties: that the Constitution gives Congress alone the power to declare war, in Article I, Section 8, and that Congress has not used that power since 5 June 1942. He has said repeatedly that he is committed to preventing presidents of either party from starting wars without robust congressional debate and authorisation. He has now forced more than a dozen Senate votes on Iran war powers measures since March, and none of his own resolutions has passed the Senate or reached a veto.

Before Thursday’s vote, Kaine acknowledged the limits of what he was asking the Senate to do. Congress cannot “make a president follow the law,” he said, according to USA Today. But he vowed that Democrats would keep trying different pressure campaigns when they take the majority in January — including in the government funding negotiations now under way to avoid a shutdown on 12 December. Democrats have said that ending the war will be a top priority when they take control of Congress next year.

Senator Bernie Sanders, the independent from Vermont who caucuses with the Democrats, renewed his criticism of the war on Thursday, calling it “based on lies” in a social media post and comparing it to the wars in Vietnam and Iraq. His intervention underlined the breadth of the opposition: it stretches from the Senate’s most consistent anti-war voices to retiring Republicans who voted against this particular measure while saying the war should end.

A war Congress has never authorised

The legal history of the Iran war is, in its own way, the story of a law that Congress wrote to restrain presidents and then watched presidents set aside. The War Powers Resolution of 1973 requires a president to report to Congress within 48 hours of introducing American forces into hostilities, and to end those hostilities within 60 days unless Congress declares war or authorises the use of force, with a further 30 days allowed for a safe withdrawal. The administration filed its report within the 48-hour window when the war began, asserting that no new congressional authorisation was required. The 60-day clock ran out on 1 May 2026. The White House says the law no longer applies.

Since then, Congress has used the law’s own voting procedures again and again. The Senate rejected Kaine’s resolution by 47 votes to 53 on 4 March, with Paul voting for it and Fetterman against. It rejected another by the same margin on 24 March. On 19 May, on the eighth attempt, the Senate voted 50 to 47 to bring Kaine’s resolution out of committee, with Collins, Murkowski, Paul and Bill Cassidy joining the Democrats — the first time a war powers measure had advanced that far. Five weeks later the Senate declined to take it up. On 3 June the House adopted House Concurrent Resolution 86 by 215 votes to 208, with four Republicans in favour, and on 23 June the Senate passed it by 50 votes to 48 — the first time both chambers had approved an Iran war powers measure. On 23 July the House passed another concurrent resolution by 214 votes to 208 while a joint resolution failed in the Senate by 47 votes to 49. On 30 July another measure failed 49 to 50. On 24 September the Senate rejected the second House-passed measure by 49 votes to 50.

There is a precedent for all of this, and it ended the same way. In 2020, Kaine led a war powers resolution against the first Trump administration’s confrontation with Iran. The Senate passed it by 55 votes to 45 on 13 February 2020 and the House passed it by 227 votes to 186 on 11 March. Mr Trump vetoed it on 6 May 2020, and the Senate’s attempt to override the veto failed by 49 votes to 44 the next day, far short of the two-thirds required. The lesson of both episodes is the same: Congress can record its opposition, and it can do so by a majority, but it cannot stop a war without a veto-proof majority — and it has never come close to one.

The war at 264 days

Thursday’s vote arrived as the war entered its 265th day, and as its costs — in money, in lives and in the region’s stability — continued to accumulate. The war has cost the United States military at least 47 billion dollars as of 16 October, according to the Pentagon, a figure cited by USA Today. A newer estimate, given by Pentagon budget official Arthur Miller to the Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday at a hearing on his nomination to be Navy comptroller, put the cost at 48.3 billion dollars as of 13 November, according to the Associated Press. The real number is certainly higher, because the military’s estimate does not include billions of dollars in damage to American bases and facilities in the Middle East, which Iran targeted at the start of the conflict.

As of 13 November, 23 American service members had died in the war, 11 of them in Iranian attacks, according to reporting on the conflict’s toll. The most intense fighting has largely subsided, but the war has settled into a grinding pattern: a naval blockade of Iran that the United States is enforcing to inflict pain on Tehran’s economy, American strikes on Iranian military targets — including a strike on 17 November against a missile launch site on Iran’s Qeshm Island — and Iranian attacks on shipping and on American facilities across the region.

The Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway through which a large share of the world’s oil passes, remains the war’s most dangerous flashpoint. Iranian forces have reported explosions on tankers in the strait, and the United States military has struck Iranian targets on Qeshm Island in response to attacks on American facilities. Iran has struck at targets in Bahrain and Kuwait in recent days, and an ADNOC tanker was reported hit off Oman. The Houthis, Iran’s allies in Yemen, fired a missile at Riyadh’s tallest tower, the Public Investment Fund Tower, on 19 November. Israel, meanwhile, launched its first ground operation in central Gaza since the October 2025 ceasefire, sending tanks across the so-called Yellow Line — an operation its military said on Thursday it had concluded.

Behind the fighting, the political pressure for a new escalation is building. The head of Israel’s Mossad spy agency, Roman Gofman, met senior American officials in Washington last week to urge the United States and Israel to resume joint strikes on Iran, according to Reuters. Israeli officials have pressed for a joint bombing campaign of four to seven days, warning that Tehran has rebuilt its missile and drone arsenals. Mr Netanyahu, serving as caretaker prime minister after inconclusive elections, has said the window for decisive action against Tehran is limited. Mr Trump, who pledged in the weeks before the election that the war would come to an end after the midterms, has since said he wants to maintain the “status quo” in the Middle East, according to USA Today. He has also said Americans should “see what happens” after 1 January 2027 — a remark that has been read in the region as a possible deadline for a decision on renewed strikes.

Analysis: Why It Matters

The vote that changed nothing — and proved it

Thursday’s vote will not end the war, shorten it by a day, or move a single ship. Everyone involved knew that before the roll was called, including the man who forced it. That is precisely why it matters. A legislature that cannot stop a war it never authorised, in a country whose Constitution gives it the sole power to declare one, has been reduced to registering its disapproval in a form the executive can file away unread. The Senate’s vote was not a decision about the war. It was a demonstration that, in the present arrangement, there is no decision available to the Senate at all — only a statement, which the president may ignore, and which he has ignored before. The June vote proved that. Thursday’s vote proved that the Senate knows it, and voted anyway, because the record itself has become the point.

Three Republicans, one Democrat, and the shape of dissent

The roll call is a map of where dissent is permitted in American politics in 2026. Collins, Murkowski and Paul are the only three Republicans who have consistently voted to end the war, and they are the only three who did so on Thursday. Collins is leaving; she lost her seat. Murkowski and Paul have built their careers on independence from their party’s leadership. Fetterman, the lone Democrat to vote no, has made support for Israel and for the war a defining feature of his politics. The more interesting names are Tillis and Hawley — men who say the war should end, who have voted to end it before, and who voted against ending it on Thursday because they objected to the instrument rather than the aim. Their reasoning is not frivolous: a non-binding resolution changes nothing, and a party that has just lost an election does not usually hand its opponents a symbolic victory on its way out. But it leaves them in the position of critics who cannot be counted when it matters, and that is a position the war’s supporters can live with very comfortably.

The midterm verdict Congress chose to ignore

The midterms of 3 November were, by every account including the president’s own, a referendum on the war and on the prices it has pushed up — for food, for fuel, for everything that moves by ship through a strait where tankers are hitting mines. Mr Trump and Vice President JD Vance have both acknowledged the conflict’s role in the results. The voters stripped the Republicans of both chambers. And yet the first vote on the war since that verdict was taken by the outgoing majority, and it went the president’s way, because the new majority does not take office until 3 January. There is a democratic awkwardness here that no amount of procedural explanation quite removes: the public has spoken, the institution has heard it, and the war goes on because the calendar says the people’s representatives must wait six more weeks to act. Kaine’s floor speech was, in effect, an appeal to a verdict that has been delivered but not yet seated.

The law that cannot enforce itself

The War Powers Resolution was written for exactly this moment — a president waging a war Congress did not authorise, for longer than the law allows, with the clock long since run out. And it has failed, not because its text is unclear, but because its enforcement depends on the very institution it is meant to restrain. A concurrent resolution cannot bind the president. A joint resolution can be vetoed. An override needs two-thirds. The 2020 precedent showed the arithmetic; the 2026 votes have confirmed it nine times over. The law’s defenders will say it was never meant to be a self-executing machine, and that its value lies in forcing public votes that hold presidents politically accountable. Thursday’s vote tested that theory too: the president’s party lost an election over this war, and its senators voted to continue it anyway. Accountability, it turns out, is also a matter of timing.

January is coming — and so is the funding fight

The real significance of Thursday’s vote is that it is almost certainly the last of its kind. When the new Congress convenes on 3 January, the Democrats will hold both chambers, and Jeffries has promised a binding resolution — one that goes to the president’s desk and forces a veto, or a signature. Kaine has promised to use the funding negotiations, with a government shutdown looming on 12 December, as leverage in the meantime. The question is whether a binding resolution can survive a veto, which requires two-thirds of both chambers, or whether the Democrats’ leverage will be spent on a funding fight that ends in a compromise. Mr Trump, for his part, has signalled that he intends to maintain the status quo — and has hinted at a decision point after 1 January. The war’s next phase, in other words, will be decided not in the Senate chamber but in the collision between a new Democratic majority, a president who has said he will not be bound by Congress, and a funding deadline that arrives three weeks before the new Congress is even seated.

What to Watch Next

  1. 12 December funding deadline: The federal government is set to shut down on 12 December unless Congress approves more funding. Democrats have said they will use the funding negotiations to press for an end to the war. Watch whether war powers language appears in any funding deal — and whether either side blinks first.
  2. 3 January 2027, the new Congress: Democrats take control of both chambers on 3 January. The first test will be how quickly Jeffries and Kaine move a binding resolution, and whether it commands more than a simple majority.
  3. A veto, and the two-thirds question: If a binding resolution reaches Mr Trump’s desk, he is expected to veto it. The decisive number will then be two-thirds of each chamber — a threshold no war powers measure has approached in this war.
  4. Mr Trump’s 1 January remark: The president has told Americans to “see what happens” after 1 January 2027. Watch for any decision on renewed strikes against Iran in the first days of the new year, and for the reaction of the incoming Democratic majority.
  5. The Strait of Hormuz: Tanker incidents, mine reports and the American naval blockade remain the war’s most immediate danger. Any further attack on shipping could force a military response that outruns the political debate in Washington.
  6. Israel’s push for joint strikes: The Mossad chief’s visit to Washington and Israel’s urging of a joint bombing campaign suggest pressure for escalation is building. Watch whether the caretaker government in Jerusalem acts alone or waits for Washington.
  7. The cost hearings: The Pentagon’s own figures put the war’s cost at 48.3 billion dollars as of 13 November, excluding damage to American bases. Further testimony, including from the Navy comptroller nominee, will keep the war’s price in public view as the funding fight approaches.

Sources

About the Author — Abdul Mannan

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *